Bramoullé, Yann and López-Pintado, Dunia and Goyal, Sanjeev and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (2004) Network formation and anti-coordination games. International Journal of Games Theory, 33 (1). pp. 1-19. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400178
Bramoullé, Yann and López-Pintado, Dunia and Goyal, Sanjeev and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (2004) Network formation and anti-coordination games. International Journal of Games Theory, 33 (1). pp. 1-19. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400178
Bramoullé, Yann and López-Pintado, Dunia and Goyal, Sanjeev and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (2004) Network formation and anti-coordination games. International Journal of Games Theory, 33 (1). pp. 1-19. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400178
Abstract
We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2×2 anti-coordination games – games where a player’s best response is to choose an action unlike that of her partner. We characterize the equilibrium networks as well as study the effects of network structure on individual behavior. Our analysis shows that both network architecture and induced behavior crucially depend on the value of the cost of forming links. In general, equilibrium configurations are found to be neither unique nor efficient.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | networks; links; anti-coordination games; efficiency |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Jan 2013 11:10 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2022 14:37 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4977 |