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Bank liquidity, bank lending, and "bad bank" policies

Morrison, Alan D and Wang, Tianxi (2021) Bank liquidity, bank lending, and "bad bank" policies. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Why are bank deposits demandable when they are also negotiable? We present a General Equilibrium model in which demandable debt exposes banks to liquidity risk so that they can signal their types and ensure that their liabilities can circulate as a means of payment. Banks can manage their liquidity risk by altering their deposit rate and their lending scale. When banks are transparent, so that depositors have homogenous information about their assets, they use only the former tool: their lending scale is effcient, and they do not experience liquidity crisis. When banks are opaque, so that depositors receive private signals of their quality, they ineffciently shrink the scale of their lending. A bank's stock of liquid assets affects its capacity for risk taking. A "bad bank" policy can resolve liquidity crises by reducing the opacity of the bank's assets.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Liquidity crises, demandable deposits, negotiable deposits, bad bank policies
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 12 Jan 2021 10:26
Last Modified: 12 Jan 2021 11:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/29501

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