Argenziano, Rossella and Gilboa, Itzhak (2023) Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15 (3). pp. 354-386. DOI https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220049
Argenziano, Rossella and Gilboa, Itzhak (2023) Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15 (3). pp. 354-386. DOI https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220049
Argenziano, Rossella and Gilboa, Itzhak (2023) Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15 (3). pp. 354-386. DOI https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220049
Abstract
A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the game may be used to predict its outcome y based on past values of (x; y). In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency, and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous formation of sunspots
Item Type: | Article |
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 24 May 2022 13:32 |
Last Modified: | 03 Aug 2023 09:25 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/32845 |
Available files
Filename: SNE.pdf