Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis and Kyropoulou, Maria and Voudouris, Alexandros (2023) Not all Strangers are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games. Theoretical Computer Science, 971. p. 114065. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114065
Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis and Kyropoulou, Maria and Voudouris, Alexandros (2023) Not all Strangers are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games. Theoretical Computer Science, 971. p. 114065. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114065
Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis and Kyropoulou, Maria and Voudouris, Alexandros (2023) Not all Strangers are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games. Theoretical Computer Science, 971. p. 114065. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114065
Abstract
Schelling's famous model of segregation assumes agents of different types, who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the possibility of agents being tolerant towards other agents, even if they are not of the same type. In particular, we consider an ordering of the types, and make the realistic assumption that the agents are in principle more tolerant towards agents of types that are closer to their own according to the ordering. Based on this, we study the strategic games induced when the agents aim to maximize their utility for a variety of tolerance levels. We provide a collection of results about the existence of equilibria, and their quality in terms of social welfare.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Nash equilibria; Price of anarchy; Schelling's segregation model |
Divisions: | Faculty of Science and Health Faculty of Science and Health > Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, School of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 24 Aug 2023 10:06 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 21:55 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/35935 |
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