Symeonidis, George (2008) Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 17 (1). pp. 247-270. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00177.x
Symeonidis, George (2008) Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 17 (1). pp. 247-270. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00177.x
Symeonidis, George (2008) Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 17 (1). pp. 247-270. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00177.x
Abstract
I analyze the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole. © 2008 Blackwell Publishing.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 16 Aug 2012 10:27 |
Last Modified: | 18 Aug 2022 11:12 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/3683 |