Research Repository

Strategic information transmission networks

Galeotti, Andrea and Ghiglino, Christian and Squintani, Francesco (2013) 'Strategic information transmission networks.' 1751 - 1769.

[img]
Preview
Text
GGSJET.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (619kB) | Preview

Abstract

We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each othersʼ actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of players truthfully communicating with each one of them. We establish that the equilibrium welfare depends not only on the number of truthful messages sent in equilibrium, but also on how evenly truthful messages are distributed across decision makers.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: D82 D85, Cheap talk, Multi-agent communication, Networks, Organizations, Strategic communication
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 04 Sep 2013 12:12
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 17:57
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/7524

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item