Galeotti, Andrea and Ghiglino, Christian and Squintani, Francesco (2013) Strategic information transmission networks. pp. 1751-1769.
Galeotti, Andrea and Ghiglino, Christian and Squintani, Francesco (2013) Strategic information transmission networks. pp. 1751-1769.
Galeotti, Andrea and Ghiglino, Christian and Squintani, Francesco (2013) Strategic information transmission networks. pp. 1751-1769.
Abstract
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each othersʼ actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of players truthfully communicating with each one of them. We establish that the equilibrium welfare depends not only on the number of truthful messages sent in equilibrium, but also on how evenly truthful messages are distributed across decision makers.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Uncontrolled Keywords: | D82 D85; Cheap talk; Multi-agent communication; Networks; Organizations; Strategic communication |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 04 Sep 2013 12:12 |
Last Modified: | 15 Jan 2022 00:40 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/7524 |
Available files
Filename: GGSJET.pdf